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NOTES
DISCIPLINING  DEFERENCE:  STRENGTHENING
THE  ROLE  OF  THE  FEDERAL  COURTS  IN  THE
NATIONAL  SECURITY  REALM
Dominic X. Barceleau*
INTRODUCTION
In a much discussed and influential speech at the National Defense Uni-
versity in May of 2013, President Barack Obama discussed the United States’
national security situation.1  About midway through the speech, President
Obama made the following statement:
The Afghan war is coming to an end.  Core al Qaeda is a shell of its former
self.  Groups like AQAP must be dealt with, but in the years to come, not
every collection of thugs that labels themselves al Qaeda will pose a credible
threat to the United States.  Unless we discipline our thinking, our defini-
tions, our actions, we may . . . continue to grant Presidents unbound powers
more suited for traditional armed conflicts between nation states.2
Despite this aspirational rhetoric, little has been done to “discipline” the
actions of the United States regarding drone strikes and other national secur-
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2018; Bachelor of Arts in
Political Science and Legal Studies, Franciscan University of Steubenville, 2015.  I would
like to thank Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell for her valuable guidance throughout the
writing process and the members of the Notre Dame Law Review for their skillful editing.  All
errors are my own.
1 See, e.g., Peter Baker, Pivoting from a War Footing, Obama Acts to Curtail Drones, N.Y.
TIMES (May 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/24/us/politics/pivoting-from-a-
war-footing-obama-acts-to-curtail-drones.html; Peter W. Singer, Finally, Obama Breaks His
Silence on Drones, BROOKINGS INST. (May 23, 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/
finally-obama-breaks-his-silence-on-drones/.
2 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National Defense Univer-
sity (May 23, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-
president-national-defense-university [hereinafter Nat’l Def. Univ. Speech].
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ity measures such as the detainment of suspected terrorists.3  As the United
States transitions into a post, post-9/11 period, the need for judicial defer-
ence to the Executive may well be decreasing along with the imminence of
national security threats.  However, federal district and appellate courts have
continued to show high deference to the executive branch in cases involving
national security.  This Note will argue that federal courts need to be more
“disciplined” in their deference determinations in order to effectively check
the Executive’s power.  Part I will look at the Constitution and its allocation
of foreign relations powers for evidence of the appropriate amount of defer-
ence that ought to be shown by the judiciary.  While the text of the Constitu-
tion is largely silent on this question, Part I will show that this silence does
not exclude a role for the judiciary in foreign affairs.  Part II will proceed to
discuss several important Supreme Court decisions that have helped to flesh
out the historical understanding of deference determinations.  These cases
will demonstrate that the Supreme Court has not historically hesitated to ful-
fill its duty to “say what the law is,”4 even in cases regarding questions of
national security.  Part III advances to the post-9/11 era and shows that dur-
ing more recent years, lower courts have conferred an unnecessarily high
level of deference to the Executive in cases involving national security issues.
After this background, Part IV will make a case for an expanded role for the
courts in hearing and reviewing questions involving national security ques-
tions and more limited deference to the Executive on these matters.  It will
argue that this should be accomplished through the application of three
principles: (1) a more formal approach to the judiciary’s role in foreign
affairs; (2) a willingness to apply international law; and (3) a narrow
approach to the issues of the case in order to avoid judicial policymaking.
Finally, Part V will analyze two recent cases, Bahlul v. United States5 and Ali
Jaber v. United States,6 in light of these principles in order to illustrate the
benefits that such an approach would have.
I. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION7
The Constitution does not vest any one branch with the plenary power
of “foreign affairs.”8  Instead, it delegates specific powers related to foreign
affairs to a branch or some combination of branches.9  Article I grants Con-
gress the powers: “To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations”; “To define
and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses
3 See, e.g., Detention, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/national-security/detention
(last visited Nov. 9, 2017); Targeted Killing, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/national-
security/targeted-killing (last visited Nov. 9, 2017).
4 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
5 840 F.3d 757 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
6 861 F.3d 241 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
7 The title of this Part is taken from Louis Henkin’s authoritative work. See LOUIS
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972).
8 See id. at 16.
9 See id. at 32.
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against the Law of Nations”; “To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and
Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water”; “To
raise and support Armies”; “To provide and maintain a Navy”; “To make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces”; and
“To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Exe-
cution the foregoing Powers.”10  Article II makes the President the “Com-
mander in Chief of the Army and Navy,” and grants him the power “by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,” to “make Treaties” and “appoint
Ambassadors.”11  Article III vests the courts with the judicial power and
extends this power to
[A]ll Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Contro-
versies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies . . .
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.12
From this cursory textual analysis, one can see that the Constitution’s
delegation of foreign affairs powers is by no means comprehensive.13  Any
attempt to justify all of the aspects of the modern foreign affairs powers in
the text of the Constitution “requires considerable stretching of language,
much reading between lines, and bold extrapolation from ‘the Constitution
as a whole.’”14  Thus, the foreign affairs powers are largely and necessarily
“extra-constitutional.”15  One must look to sources outside the Constitution
to determine the location and limits of such powers.16  Of particular impor-
tance for this Note is the role of the judiciary in foreign affairs—under what
circumstances and to what degree should the judiciary show deference to the
political branches?  When the political branches are acting within their spe-
cific constitutionally delegated authority—for example, when Congress
declares war or when the Executive negotiates a treaty—the judiciary ought
not refuse to review a challenge to such action.  To borrow the words of Pro-
fessor Henkin, “There is reason for due deference to the executive, but not
for undue deference—for due judicial humility, but not undue humility.”17
The Federalist Papers provides some important insight into the question of
judicial deference.  These writings show that the Founding Fathers clearly
10 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
11 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
12 U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2.
13 See HENKIN, supra note 7, at 16 (listing the numerous aspects of the foreign affairs
power not specifically enumerated by the Constitution).
14 Id. at 17.
15 Id. at 26.
16 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (“[The
foreign affairs powers] exist as inherently inseparable from the conception of nationality.
This the court recognized, and . . . found the warrant for its conclusions not in the provi-
sions of the Constitution, but in the law of nations.”).
17 LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 72 (1990).
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contemplated an independent role for the judiciary in foreign affairs.18  In
The Federalist No. 3, while arguing that the national government is better
suited than the state governments to deal with foreign affairs, John Jay wrote,
“It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the laws of
nations . . . .”19  Jay clearly contemplated a role for the judiciary in ensuring
this observance.  He argued that the national government would attract the
best and brightest minds, with the “result that the administration, the politi-
cal counsels, and the judicial decisions of the national government will be
more wise, systematical, and judicious than those of individual States, and
consequently more satisfactory with respect to other nations.”20  Alexander Ham-
ilton further explained the role of the judiciary in foreign affairs in The Feder-
alist No. 80: “The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers
for the conduct of its members. . . . [And] it will follow that the federal judici-
ary ought to have cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of other coun-
tries are concerned.”21  Furthermore, he noted that “cases arising upon
treaties and the laws of nations . . . may be supposed proper for the federal
jurisdiction.”22  These writings show that the Framers intended the federal
courts to play a role in foreign affairs, even to the point of handling cases
arising under the laws of nations.  The Supreme Court has decided a number
of cases that have further shaped the contours of the judiciary’s role in for-
eign affairs.  Part II will discuss these cases and their effect.
II. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE JUDICIARY
The federal judiciary has decided cases involving issues of foreign affairs
and national security from the time of the United States’ founding.  The
Supreme Court has not always refused to hear a case simply because it
requires the consideration of issues touching on foreign affairs.23  Part II will
look at several of these cases to identify the level of deference the judiciary
has historically shown to the executive branch in this field.
To begin, in Bas v. Tingy,24 which touched on an ongoing conflict
between the United States and France, the Supreme Court was called on to
interpret a U.S. statute to determine “[w]hether France was an enemy of the
United States, within the meaning of the law?”25  Though Congress had
18 See Martin S. Flaherty, Judicial Foreign Relations Authority After 9/11, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 119, 120–21 (2012) (“For Jay and Hamilton especially, a crucial component for the
maintenance of national security would be an independent federal judiciary.”).
19 THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay).
20 Id. (emphasis added).
21 THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton).
22 Id.
23 See Joshua Andresen, Due Process of War in the Age of Drones, 41 YALE J. INT’L L. 155,
164–67 (2016) (discussing the Supreme Court’s willingness to review military activity). See
generally Louis Fisher, Judicial Review of the War Power, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 466 (2005)
(chronicling Supreme Court treatment of foreign affairs issues).
24 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800).
25 Id. at 37 (emphasis omitted).
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made no declaration of war,26 the Court held that, for the purposes of the
statute, France and the United States were enemies.27  The Supreme Court
did not defer to the judgment of the Executive or wait for Congress to
declare war before deciding the case.  Instead, this decision was reached by
looking at “the situation of the United States in relation to France.”28  The
Court looked at evidence such as the United States’ “dissolv[ing its] treaty”
with France and Congress’s “enjoining the [United States] . . . to attack
[France] on the high seas.”29
A second informative case from this time period is Little v. Barreme.30
During the same conflict with France, Congress passed a law requiring the
seizure of American ships travelling to French ports.31  President John Adams
instructed Captain Little to stop ships “bound to, or from, French ports.”32
The Court was asked to decide if Captain Little was excused from paying
damages because he was acting according to the President’s instructions.
Answering this question required the Supreme Court to consider whether
the Executive’s interpretation of the law superseded the intent of the Con-
gress.  The Court held that it did not, explaining, “instructions cannot . . .
legalize an act which without those instructions would have been a plain tres-
pass.”33  Here again, the Supreme Court did not sit out the case because it
involved foreign affairs.  And they did not simply defer to the political
branches.  Instead, the Court chose to interpret and apply the relevant law
despite the fact that the Executive had interpreted it differently.  The Court
held the Executive accountable for its actions instead of deferring to its
judgment.
Following these early cases, the Supreme Court continued to take and
decide cases involving foreign affairs issues throughout the nineteenth and
the first half of the twentieth centuries.  During the Civil War, President Lin-
coln instituted a blockade of southern ports.34  Several suits arose after neu-
tral ships were seized in this blockade in what are known as the The Prize
Cases.35  At the heart of these cases was the President’s ability to institute the
blockade.  This question required the Court to decide whether “a state of war
existed which would justify a resort to these means of subduing the hostile
force.”36  Even though Congress had not officially declared war, the Supreme
Court did not accept that no state of war existed.  Instead, the Court analyzed
26 See id. at 41.
27 See id. at 42–43.
28 Id. at 41.
29 Id.
30 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
31 See id. at 170–71.
32 Id. at 171.
33 Id. at 179.
34 Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation by the President of the United States of America
on Blockade of Confederate Ports (1861), https://www.loc.gov/item/scsm000582/
(accessed November 30, 2016.)
35 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
36 Id. at 666.
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whether a “de facto”37 war existed based on jus belli and the law of nations.38
Using these international law principles, the Court found that a state of war
existed and therefore, “the President had a right, jure belli, to institute a
blockade of ports in possession of the States in rebellion.”39
Though there are others,40 these examples demonstrate that the
Supreme Court has a long history of involvement in national security issues
and has even at times held the Executive’s foreign affairs actions to be in
violation of the law.  However, from this early period through the first half of
the twentieth century, the Supreme Court did not have a clearly articulated
standard for determining when it could decide cases involving national secur-
ity issues and when it should defer to the Executive.41  The doctrine by which
federal courts determine which questions they can answer and which the
Constitution requires the political branches of government resolve is known
as the political question doctrine.42  The political question doctrine naturally
flows from the Constitution’s system of separated powers.  It stands for the
idea that some decisions are constitutionally committed to the political
branches of government—the executive and the legislative—and cannot be
decided by the judiciary.43  Scholars have attributed the beginning of the
political question doctrine in Supreme Court jurisprudence to Marbury v.
Madison,44 where Chief Justice Marshall explained, “Questions, in their
nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the
executive, can never be made in this court.”45  Given the explicit constitu-
37 Id.
38 Id. at 666–70.
39 Id. at 671.
40 See, e.g., Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857) (construing the constitu-
tional powers of the Court in a challenge to the legality of a court martial); Fleming v.
Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 614–15 (1850) (finding that the powers granted to the Presi-
dent by a declaration of war do not include the power to annex territory to the Union);
Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827) (finding that the President alone has the
authority to call forth the militia, but not hesitating to review the question); Brown v.
United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814) (ruling on the question of whether enemy
property can be seized under a declaration of war).
41 See Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1393 n.257 (1988) (not-
ing that the political question doctrine was “first articulated thoroughly in Baker v. Carr”).
42 Political Question, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A question that a court
will not consider because it involves the exercise of discretionary power by the executive or
legislative branch of government.”).
43 See Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 597 (1976)
(“That there are political questions . . . is axiomatic in a system of constitutional govern-
ment built on the separation of powers.”).
44 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803); see Tara Leigh Grove, The Lost History of the
Political Question Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1908, 1910 & n.4 (2015) (discussing the origins
of the political question doctrine and noting scholarly articles attributing its beginnings to
Marbury v. Madison).
45 Marbury, 5 U.S at 170.
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tional role of the executive and legislative branches in foreign affairs,46 politi-
cal questions often arise in the national security context.
While the principle underlying the political question doctrine has been
around since Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine was not particularly well
defined through the first half of the twentieth century.  This began to change
with the landmark decision of Baker v. Carr.47  For the first time, the Court
set forth a clearly articulated formula to determine what constitutes a politi-
cal question.48  The Supreme Court named six elements that might make a
case a nonjusticiable political question:
[1] [A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial dis-
cretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent reso-
lution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a polit-
ical decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.49
While the issues in Baker were not related to foreign affairs, the Court
discussed the political question doctrine in this context because of the signifi-
cant number of foreign affairs cases raising potential political question
problems.50  The Court explained that while “[t]here are sweeping state-
ments to the effect that all questions touching foreign relations are political
questions . . . it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which
touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.”51  In recent years,
however, many federal courts have used the Baker framework to show a high
degree of deference to the executive branch on matters of national secur-
ity.52  In some instances, this deference may have been warranted.  The years
following 9/11 were undoubtedly a dangerous time for the United States.
The country was involved in two wars and fighting a new kind of enemy:
46 See supra Part I.
47 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
48 Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine
and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 264 (2002) (explaining that in
Baker v. Carr, “the Court engaged in its most detailed discussion of the political question
doctrine to date”).  It is important to note, however, that despite the formulaic nature of
the Baker decision, many commentators have criticized the decision and questioned its
usefulness. See, e.g., Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 45 (D.D.C. 2010) (“Unfortu-
nately, the Baker factors are much easier to enumerate than they are to apply, and it is
perhaps for this reason that the political question doctrine ‘continues to be the subject of
scathing scholarly attack.’  Dean Erwin Chemerinsky has gone so far as to remark that the
Baker criteria ‘seem useless in identifying what constitutes a political question.’” (citation
omitted) (first quoting Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1514 (D.C. Cir.
1984); then quoting ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 149 (5th ed. 2007))).
49 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
50 See id. at 211–13.
51 Id. at 211.
52 See infra Part III.
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terrorism.  National security was genuinely and imminently threatened in
ways that the United States had never before experienced.  Accordingly, the
executive branch needed latitude to properly exercise its authority and deal
with the crisis at hand.  Since this time, however, the need for such deference
has waned.  Still, courts—especially the district and circuit courts—have con-
tinued to defer heavily to the Executive.53
III. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE JUDICIARY: MODERN JURISPRUDENCE
Part III will now analyze several significant Supreme Court cases from
the post-9/11 era, focusing on the level of deference shown to the Executive.
It will then discuss lower court cases that illustrate how the lower courts have
been overly and inconsistently deferential to the Executive in cases involving
national security issues.
A. Supreme Court Decisions
An early post-9/11 era case concerning national security issues to reach
the Supreme Court was Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.54  The case arose out of the
detention of a United States citizen, Yaser Esam Hamdi, who the government
alleged had taken up arms for the Taliban against the United States in
Afghanistan.55  Hamdi was seized by coalition forces in Afghanistan in 2001
and turned over to the U.S. military.  The United States initially detained
Hamdi in Guantanamo Bay, but authorities transferred him to a naval prison
in Virginia after discovering that he was an American citizen.56  The United
States designated Hamdi an “enemy combatant,” which would have allowed
the government to detain him indefinitely.57  Hamdi’s father petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his son’s detention violated the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.58  After the district court was
unable to make a determination on the legality of the detention on the evi-
dence provided, the Fourth Circuit engaged in a comprehensive review of
the relationship between the executive and judicial branches during wartime.
The Fourth Circuit explained, “The importance of limitations on judicial
activities during wartime may be inferred from the allocation of powers
under our constitutional scheme,” and accordingly, “the Supreme Court has
shown great deference to the political branches when called upon to decide
cases implicating sensitive matters of foreign policy, national security, or mili-
53 See HENKIN, supra note 17, at 82–83 (“[L]ower courts have found issues to be politi-
cal and nonjusticiable more often during the past twenty-five years since Baker than in all
our previous history.”).
54 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion).
55 Id. at 510.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 511.
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tary affairs.”59  The court went on to enumerate the reasons why this defer-
ence is required, including the political branches’ better organization to
supervise overseas conflict, the judiciary’s lack of accountability to the electo-
rate, the textual allocation of powers, and the separation of powers.60  In
keeping with the doctrine of separation of powers, the court held that
because of the President’s “extraordinarily broad authority as Commander in
Chief” the court had to “assume a deferential posture in reviewing exercises
of this authority.”61  Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit refused to review
Hamdi’s status as an enemy combatant and the facts surrounding his capture
because doing so would “require us to step so far out of our role as judges
that we would abandon the distinctive deference that animates this area of
law.”62  The Fourth Circuit’s employment of this “distinctive deference” to
the Executive was, in large part, motivated by the national security concerns
faced by of the United States at the time.
The Supreme Court, however, rejected the separation of powers reason-
ing that the Fourth Circuit adopted.  Justice O’Connor, writing for a plural-
ity, explained that the Executive was undoubtedly “best positioned” to make
national security decisions and acknowledged that there are legitimate con-
cerns that could arise from imposing the burdens of running a military com-
mission in a warzone.63  However, the Court did not find that these concerns
precluded the judiciary from considering Hamdi’s status as an enemy com-
batant.  Justice O’Connor wrote:
While we accord the greatest respect and consideration to the judgments of
military authorities in matters relating to the actual prosecution of a war,
and recognize that the scope of that discretion necessarily is wide, it does not
infringe on the core role of the military for the courts to exercise their own
time-honored and constitutionally mandated roles of reviewing and resolv-
ing claims like those presented here.64
Review of executive action by the Supreme Court does not necessarily
violate separation of powers, but rather, as the Court pointed out, helps to
maintain the separation by preventing “condens[ing] power into a single
branch of government.”65 Hamdi demonstrates that, while lower courts have
been quick to defer to the Executive, the Supreme Court has engaged in
more searching review of questions of national security, even early in the
post-9/11 era.
A second important case from the post-9/11 era is Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.66
Two years after Hamdi, Salim Ahmed Hamdan brought another unlawful
59 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 462–63 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 507
(2004) (plurality opinion).
60 See id. at 463.
61 Id. at 474.
62 Id. at 473.
63 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531.
64 Id. at 535.
65 Id. at 536.
66 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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detention case against the United States.  Hamdan was a Yemeni national
who was captured in Afghanistan and imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay.  After
more than a year of imprisonment without charge, President Bush deemed
Hamdan eligible for trial by a military commission, but he was not charged
with any specific crimes.67  A year later, he was charged with conspiracy to
commit offenses triable by a military commission including “attacking civil-
ians; attacking civilian objects; murder by an unprivileged belligerent; and
terrorism.”68  The charging document also alleged that Hamdan had served
as Osama bin Laden’s “bodyguard and personal driver,” transported weap-
ons, transported Osama bin Laden to anti-American lectures, and received
weapons training from Al Qaeda.69  In response to this charge, Hamdan filed
petitions for writs of habeas corpus and mandamus.  He argued that the mili-
tary commission did not have the authority to try him because conspiracy
“triable by military commission” did not violate any statute or the law of war,
and because the military commission procedure violated military and inter-
national law since he would not be able to review the United States’ evidence
against him.70  The district court granted the habeas petition, but the D.C.
Circuit reversed, finding that the Geneva Conventions invoked by Hamdan
were not judicially enforceable and that the commission would not violate
either the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) or the military regula-
tions designed to enforce the Geneva Conventions.71
The Supreme Court granted certiorari despite the government’s argu-
ment that the Detainee Treatment Act72 (DTA) precluded the Court from
hearing the case.73  On the merits, the Court first addressed the issue of
whether the President had the power to try Hamdan by military commission.
The Court found that “[t]ogether, the UCMJ, the AUMF, and the DTA at
most acknowledge a general Presidential authority to convene military com-
missions in circumstances where justified under the ‘Constitution and laws,’
including the law of war.”74  The Court then turned to the question of
“whether Hamdan’s military commission is so justified.”75  To answer this
question, the Court explained that in order for the commission to be lawful it
needed to be in “compliance not only with the American common law of war,
but also with the rest of the UCMJ itself, insofar as applicable, and with the
‘rules and precepts of the law of nations,’ . . . including . . . the four Geneva
Conventions signed in 1949.”76  The Court did not defer to the Executive’s
claim that the commission was in accordance with these laws or that the laws
67 See id. at 566.
68 Id. at 570.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 567–68.
71 Id.
72 Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 1, 5, 10, 15, 16, 28, 37, 41, 42, and 50 U.S.C.).
73 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 584.
74 Id. at 594–95.
75 Id. at 595.
76 Id. at 613 (citation omitted) (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942)).
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were not applicable.  Instead, the Court found that the procedures for the
commission violated the UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions.77  In response
to the government’s argument that the Court could not enforce the Geneva
Conventions, Justice Stevens explained that as part of the law of war they are
included in Article 21 of the UCMJ78 and must be followed.79  Even though
al-Qaeda was not a signatory to the Convention, the Court still found that at
least one of the Conventions applied.80 Hamdan demonstrates the Supreme
Court’s willingness to interpret and apply international law to the exercise of
executive power.  The Court did not show complete deference to the execu-
tive branch when determining whether the military commission’s procedure
complied with international law.  Instead, it interpreted and applied the rele-
vant international law and found the Executive’s action to be in violation.
A final post-9/11 Supreme Court case, Boumediene v. Bush,81 also
involved Guantanamo detainees and required the Court to consider the
question of judicial deference to the Executive.  In Boumediene, the Court
addressed to the issue of “whether there are prudential barriers to habeas
corpus review” in cases of Guantanamo detainees.82  In its opinion, the Court
first made note of “[t]he real risks, the real threats, of terrorist attacks.”83
Because of this threat, the Court reasoned, the judicial branch must take
practical considerations into account when considering issues of national
security like habeas review for suspected terrorists.84  Consequently, “proper
deference must be accorded to the political branches,” which are better
suited to answer questions of national security.85  This “proper deference,”
however, in no way prevented the judiciary from exercising some review of
the Executive’s foreign affairs powers.  The Court explained:
On the contrary, the exercise of those powers is vindicated, not eroded,
when confirmed by the Judicial Branch.  Within the Constitution’s separa-
77 See id. at 567.
78 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2012) (“The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction
upon courts-martial do not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or other military
tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or
by the law of war may be tried by military commissions, provost courts, or other military
tribunals.”).
79 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 602.
80 Id. at 629–30 (“‘[E]ach Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a mini-
mum,’ certain provisions protecting ‘[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities,
including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors
de combat by . . . detention.’  One such provision prohibits ‘the passing of sentences and the
carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly consti-
tuted court[,] affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable
by civilized peoples.’” (second and third alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quot-
ing Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3318, 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. 135)).
81 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
82 Id. at 793.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 796.
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tion-of-powers structure, few exercises of judicial power are as legitimate or
as necessary as the responsibility to hear challenges to the authority of the
Executive to imprison a person.86
This passage articulates the clearly established role of the judiciary when
reviewing the exercise of foreign affairs and military powers.  But Justice Ken-
nedy, the author of the majority opinion, did not stop there.  In a somewhat
ominous statement, he seemed to contemplate an expanded role for the
judiciary in reviewing war powers cases: “Because our Nation’s past military
conflicts have been of limited duration, it has been possible to leave the
outer boundaries of war powers undefined.  If, as some fear, terrorism con-
tinues to pose dangerous threats to us for years to come, the Court might not
have this luxury.”87
As the War on Terror has progressed, this statement seems more appli-
cable than ever.  The United States has still not completed its withdrawal
from Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria are in a state of serious instability, and the
self-styled Islamic State is providing a new threat in the form of a decentral-
ized and widely dispersed terror network.88  That being said, progress is,
without a doubt, being made.  While terror is still a threat to the United
States, the likelihood of a large-scale, 9/11-type attack is not as imminent as it
once was.89  Returning again to President Obama’s speech at the National
Defense University, we must “discipline our thinking, our definitions, our
actions” as we proceed into a post, post-9/11 era.90
B. Lower Court Decisions
Having established that the Supreme Court has regularly taken and
decided cases involving national security issues, this Section will now look at
some post-9/11 district and circuit court decisions and analyze the level of
deference shown to the Executive.
First, in El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. v. United States,91 a Sudanese
company sued the United States after its plant was destroyed because of its
alleged connection with Osama bin Laden.92  The plaintiffs alleged that the
86 Id. at 797.
87 Id. at 797–98.
88 See James R. Clapper, Statement for the Record; Worldwide Threat Assessment of
the U.S. Intelligence Community 4, 26 (2016) (noting that “fighting will continue to
threaten US personnel, our Allies, and international partners—including Afghans—partic-
ularly in Kabul and other urban population centers” in Afghanistan, and “[t]he Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has become the preeminent terrorist threat because of
. . . its branches and emerging branches in other countries, and its increasing ability to
direct and inspire attacks against a wide range of targets around the world”).
89 See id. at 4 (“A smaller number [of terrorist organizations] will attempt to overcome
the logistical challenges associated with conducting attacks on the US homeland.”).
90 Nat’l Def. Univ. Speech, supra note 2.
91 El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en
banc).
92 See id. at 838.
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attack and the United States’ subsequent failure to compensate them violated
customary international law that requires states to compensate for the
destruction of property that is “mistaken and not justified.”93  They further
alleged that the connection to Osama bin Laden was unjustified.94  The D.C.
Circuit held that it was barred from hearing these claims under the political
question doctrine.95  In reaching this conclusion, the en banc court
explained, “In military matters in particular, the courts lack the competence
to assess the strategic decision to deploy force or to create standards to deter-
mine whether the use of force was justified or well-founded.”96  Therefore,
the court refused to “assess the merits of the President’s decision to launch
an attack on a foreign target.”97  Here, the D.C. Circuit showed extraordinary
deference to the executive branch.  However, this reasoning is either mis-
taken or clearly false.  First, the court was mistaken if it believed it was being
asked to assess the merits of the attack.  It is generally accepted that the
determination of whether a specific military action is a good idea or the right
choice in the specific context is a political question.98  However, the court
did not necessarily need to make this determination.  Instead, the court
could have determined whether the attack was in accordance with interna-
tional law, a task that could be accomplished without judging the wisdom of a
specific strategic or tactical decision.  Therefore, to say that it would have to
“create standards” in order to determine whether the attack was justified is
false.  Clearly established and longstanding international law on the rules of
war are applicable to these circumstances, and U.S. courts have applied these
rules in the past.99  For these reasons, the deference shown by the D.C. Cir-
cuit in this case was both unnecessary and far too high.
Two cases arising from the targeting and subsequent killing of Anwar Al-
Aulaqi further demonstrate how the lower federal courts have been overly—
and inconsistently—deferential to the Executive.  These highly publicized
cases involve the targeted killing of a United States citizen and Islamic cleric,
Anwar Al-Aulaqi, for his anti-American preaching and involvement with Al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).100  First, in Al-Aulaqi v. Obama,101
Anwar’s father, Nasser, filed a claim in the United States District Court for
93 Id. at 844.
94 See id. at 839.
95 See id. at 844.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 See Chad C. Carter, Halliburton Hears a Who? Political Question Doctrine Developments in
the Global War on Terror and Their Impact on Government Contingency Contracting, 201 MIL. L.
REV. 86, 99–100 (2009).
99 MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES AND
MATERIALS 867–983 (7th ed. 2015) (discussing international law and the use of force
including its application in U.S. courts).
100 Anwar al-Awlaki, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/topic/person/anwar-alawlaki
(last visited Nov. 9, 2017) (providing “[n]ews about Anwar al Awlaki, including commen-
tary and archival articles published in The New York Times”).
101 Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010).
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the District of Columbia that alleged that the United States violated a num-
ber of Anwar’s constitutional rights and the Alien Tort Statute by putting him
on a secret “kill list” and also sought to prevent the government from carry-
ing out the killing.102  The district court, relying on El-Shifa found that the
political question doctrine prevented it from hearing the case.103  It did,
however, seem to give more consideration to the role the judiciary can play
in national security cases.  Noting that the political question doctrine does
not bar courts from hearing all cases involving foreign affairs, the court
explained, “Hence, in order to decide whether a particular legal challenge
constitutes an impermissible ‘attack on foreign policymaking’ or is instead a
justiciable claim with a permissible ‘effect on foreign affairs,’ a court ‘must
conduct “a discriminating analysis of the particular question posed” in the
“specific case.”’”104  As the court proceeded, no such discriminating analysis
of the question was conducted.  Instead, the court simply named a series of
highly specific, factual inquiries that would need to be made in order for the
court to make its decision, and claimed that these inquiries were exactly the
type of “complex policy questions” that the courts should not answer.105
This absolute deference does not reflect the proper role for the judiciary.
While courts will need to make factual inquiries like these, they should not
prevent the cases from being heard.  Courts may pay a significant amount of
deference to the Executive’s determination on the level of threat and the
alternative options, but there are clear standards of international law that the
courts can apply to these factual determinations, and as the Supreme Court
noted in Marbury v. Madison, “It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.”106
In 2014, Al-Aulaqi again made his way into the federal courts, this time
in Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta.107  This suit was brought after Anwar had been killed
by a U.S. drone strike and the suit alleged a violation of Anwar’s due process
rights, his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, and his
102 Id. at 12 (“He asserts . . . violat[ions of] (1) Anwar Al-Aulaqi’s Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable seizures and (2) his Fifth Amendment right not to be
deprived of life without due process of law.  Plaintiff further claims that (3) the United
States’s refusal to disclose the criteria by which it selects U.S. citizens like plaintiff’s son for
targeted killing independently violates the notice requirement of the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause.  Finally, plaintiff brings (4) a statutory claim under the Alien Tort
Statute (‘ATS’) alleging that the United States’s ‘policy of targeted killings violates treaty
and customary international law.’” (citations omitted)).
103 See id. at 52.
104 Id. at 46 (quoting El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 841
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc)).
105 Id. (explaining that hearing the case would require inquiries such as “the precise
nature and extent of Anwar Al-Aulaqi’s affiliation with AQAP,” “whether . . . [his] alleged
terrorist activity renders him a ‘concrete, specific, and imminent threat to life or physical
safety,’” and “whether there are ‘means short of lethal force’ that the United States could
‘reasonably’ employ” to address any threat).
106 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
107 35 F. Supp. 3d 56 (2014).
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right under the Bill of Attainder Clause of the Constitution.108  The district
court found that case was not barred by the political question doctrine.109
Instead, the court explained that the “Supreme Court has repeatedly found
that claims based on [due process] rights are justiciable, even if they impli-
cate foreign policy decisions.”110  The courrt also distinguished the case from
El-Shifa on the grounds that the plaintiffs in that case had been foreigners
suing for a deprivation of property, which is “not comparable to U.S. citizens
suing for deprivation of their lives.”111  The district court’s willingness to
decide this case highlights an inconsistency in lower court determinations of
deference to the Executive.  While Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta was ultimately dis-
missed on the merits, the court felt that it was capable of deciding the case.
There was no discerning analysis of the case’s possible effects on foreign
affairs and no discussion of any “complex policy questions”—two essential
aspects of the court’s analysis in Al-Aulaqi v. Obama.112  Instead, the court
accepted its duty to say what the law is without being overly deferential to the
Executive.
A final informative lower court case is Schneider v. Kissinger.113  This suit
was brought on behalf of the estate of Chilean General René Schneider
against the United States and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger for
causing the kidnapping, torture, and death of Schneider.  The D.C. Circuit
held that the suit raised nonjusticiable political questions.114  The D.C. Cir-
cuit found that four of the six Baker factors prevented the case from being
heard.115  First, regarding the textually demonstrable commitment to other
branches of government, the court explained that precedent and the text of
the Constitution clearly allocate foreign affairs to the political branches.  This
analysis seemed to leave no room for judicial review of foreign affairs ques-
tions, explaining that the Constitution gives the judiciary “no authority for
policymaking in the realm of foreign relations or provision of national secur-
ity.”116  Turning to the second factor, a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards, the court found that it could not address the claim
without having to “define the standard for the government’s use of covert
operations in conjunction with political turmoil in another country.”117  The
court also felt that this case would require an initial policy question of a kind
requiring nonjudicial discretion in that it would “be forced to pass judgment
108 See id. at 65–66.
109 See id. at 68–70.
110 Id. at 69 (alteration in original) (quoting Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v.
Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
111 Id. at 70.
112 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 46 (D.D.C. 2010).
113 412 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
114 See id. at 191.
115 Id. at 198.
116 Id. at 195.
117 Id. at 197.
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on the policy-based decision of the executive to use covert action to prevent
that government from taking power.”118
While it is not the job of the courts to pass judgment on every foreign
policy decision made by the political branches, they cannot stand by and
allow violations of the Constitution.119  This approach ignores the Supreme
Court precedent discussed above and essentially limits the role of the Court
in foreign affairs to that of a bystander.  While there may be a lack of clear
standards in domestic law to address the issue raised in Schneider, standards
can be found in international law,120 which the Supreme Court has
explained “is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by
the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”121  Further-
more, it is a mischaracterization of the question presented to suggest that the
court would have been forced to develop a policy for the use of covert action.
The proper inquiry is whether the policy chosen by the political branches of
government was consistent with the Constitution and the laws of the United
States, which includes applicable international law.122  The result in this case
shows a concerning level of deference to the Executive, essentially leaving it
unaccountable for any actions taken in the name of national security.
IV. DETERMINING DUE DEFERENCE
The foregoing analysis shows that lower federal courts have, at worst,
abdicated their responsibility to apply the law to cases involving issues of
national security and, at best, been inconsistent in the level of deference
shown to the executive branch.  As the United States continues to engage in
the type of activity that gives rise to cases implicating controversial national
security issues the judiciary’s need for clear and consistent principles to apply
in making deference determinations will only grow.123  Despite the decreas-
ing imminence of threats faced by the United States,124 the current and past
presidential administrations have not reigned in executive power in the
national security realm.  The Obama administration detained and interro-
118 Id.
119 Cf. HENKIN, supra note 17, at 72, 87–88.
120 See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113.
121 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
122 HENKIN, supra note 17, at 78–79 (“Judicial review is necessary in foreign affairs, at
least as much as elsewhere, to assure that we are a constitutional democracy.  Courts ought
to exercise that task in foreign affairs, at least as effectively as elsewhere.”).
123 See Michael J. Glennon, National Security and Double Government, 5 HARV. NAT’L SEC.
J. 1, 2 (2014) (discussing the continuity in national security policies between the Bush and
Obama administrations).
124 See Nat’l Def. Univ. Speech, supra note 2 (discussing the current national security
situation and noting that the Iraq War has ended, “Osama bin Laden is dead [along with]
most of his top lieutenants,” “the core of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan is on the
path to defeat,” “[f]rom Yemen to Iraq, from Somalia to North Africa, the threat today is
more diffuse,” and “we are safer because of our efforts”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-2\NDL209.txt unknown Seq: 17 28-DEC-17 10:46
2017] disciplining  deference 887
gated terrorism suspects abroad, held American citizens in military confine-
ment without trial, decided whether suspected terrorists were tried by civilian
court or military commission, kept Guantanamo Bay open, restricted the
rights of detainees, and greatly increased drone usage and targeted killings,
including the targeting of a United States citizen.125  President Obama
claimed to have “worked vigorously to establish a framework that governs our
use of force against terrorists” by establishing “clear guidelines, oversight and
accountability . . . codified in [his] Presidential Policy Guidance.”126  How-
ever, the Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) was only an internal restraint
on those within the executive branch.  There remained no means of ensur-
ing that the Executive actually followed that guidance or that the guidance
conformed to the applicable domestic and international law.  Furthermore,
until August of 2016, the PPG remained classified as Top Secret.127  It was
only in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) suit by the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) that the Obama administration released
the PPG, and even then, only a heavily redacted version.128  This level of
accountability is not a “disciplined” approach to executive power.
Though the Trump presidency is still in its early stages, all indications
are that the Trump administration will continue with similar, if not more
aggressive, policies.129  Controversial tweets aside,130 President Trump has
begun taking steps to further empower the executive branch in the national
security realm.  The New York Times has reported that President Trump
intends to “keep [Guantanamo] open indefinitely” and allow newly captured
terror suspects, including members of the Islamic State, to be detained
125 See Glennon, supra note 123, at 2–8 & nn.2–37.
126 See Nat’l Def. Univ. Speech, supra note 2.
127 Karen DeYoung, Newly Declassified Document Sheds Light on How President Approves




128 See U.S. Releases Drone Strike ‘Playbook’ in Response to ACLU Lawsuit, ACLU (Aug. 6,
2016), https://www.aclu.org/news/us-releases-drone-strike-playbook-response-aclu-lawsuit.
129 See, e.g., AP, Trump Talks Tough on Guantanamo, but Doesn’t Differ Much From Obama
on Policy, CBS NEWS (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-talks-tough-on-
guantanamo-but-doesnt-differ-much-from-obama-on-policy/; Charlie Savage & Adam
Goldman, Trump Officials Renew Effort to Expand Use of Prison at Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/18/us/politics/trump-guantanamo-
executive-order.html; Charlie Savage & Eric Schmitt, Trump Poised to Drop Some Limits on
Drone Strikes and Commando Raids, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/09/21/us/politics/trump-drone-strikes-commando-raids-rules.html.
130 See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Aug. 18, 2017, 6:06
AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/898531481185689600 (“Radical
Islamic Terrorism must be stopped by whatever means necessary!  The courts must give us
back our protective rights.  Have to be tough!”); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
TWITTER (Jan. 3, 2017, 9:20 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/8163334
80409833472 (“There should be no further releases from Gitmo.  These are extremely
dangerous people and should not be allowed back onto the battlefield.”).
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there.131  Another report indicates that President Trump plans to water
down the Obama administration’s internal drone limitations.  Possible
changes include expanding the targets of drone strikes from only “high-level
militants deemed to pose a ‘continuing and imminent threat’ to Americans”
to “foot-soldier jihadists with no special skills or leadership roles” and remov-
ing the “high-level vetting” requirements for drone attacks.132  These
changes could further expand the geographic scope of U.S. drone strikes to
areas outside the active theater of war.133  Use of lethal force outside an area
of active hostilities is especially problematic under international law.134  The
United States began to execute such attacks during the Obama administra-
tion against “ ‘high-value targets’ in Pakistan and Yemen,” and under Presi-
dent Trump’s reported changes, “the new approach would appear to remove
some obstacles for possible strikes in countries where Qaeda- or Islamic State-
linked militants are operating, from Nigeria to the Philippines.”135
The practices of the Obama and Trump administrations demonstrate
that a check is needed on executive power in the national security realm.  As
noted by Justice Kennedy is Boumediene v. Bush, “Because our Nation’s past
military conflicts have been of limited duration, it has been possible to leave
the outer boundaries of war powers undefined.  If, as some fear, terrorism
continues to pose dangerous threats to us for years to come, the Court might
not have this luxury.”136  The time for this luxury has passed.  The first step
toward defining the outer boundaries of the war powers is disciplining the
judiciary’s deference to the executive branch.  The remainder of this Part will
propose three constitutionally and precedentially sound principles courts
can use to begin this process.137
As a first principle, courts should use a formal, rather than functional,
method of analysis in cases involving national security issues.  Courts have
historically taken a more functional approach to cases involving foreign
affairs.138  Some of the more recent Supreme Court cases mentioned above,
however, indicate that the Supreme Court has begun to shift toward a formal
131 See Savage & Goldman, supra note 129.
132 See Savage & Schmitt, supra note 129.
133 See id.
134 See Mary Ellen O’Connell & Brian Boyd, Drone Technology and the Trump Doctrine, E-
INT’L REL. (June 29, 2017), http://www.e-ir.info/2017/06/29/drone-technology-and-the-
trump-doctrine/ (“Outside armed conflict and absent the right to resort to armed force,
lethal military force may only be used to save a life which is immediately, directly
threatened.”).
135 See Savage & Schmitt, supra note 129.
136 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797–98 (2008).
137 For the remainder of this Part, I rely primarily on the following works: THOMAS M.
FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTION/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN
AFFAIRS? (1992); HENKIN, supra note 17; and Jonathan I. Charney, Judicial Deference in For-
eign Relations, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 98 (Louis Henkin et al. eds.,
1990).
138 See Harlan Grant Cohen, Formalism and Distrust: Foreign Affairs Law in the Roberts
Court, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 380, 386 (2015).
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approach.139  The functional approach, based largely on the Baker factors,
has led to inconsistent and confusing results.140  Put simply, “[t]he courts
need new guidance.”141  A more formal approach to foreign affairs, looking
at the text of the Constitution, would clarify when and whether the judiciary
should defer to the political branches.  As noted by Professor Louis Henkin,
“If it is textually demonstrable that an issue is committed to a coordinate
political department, the issue is not for that reason nonjusticiable; the court
should honor that textual commitment by adjudicating the question and
finding that the political branch acted within its constitutional authority.”142
While the first factor from Baker is in line with a formal approach, the others
are “contradicted by the institution of judicial review itself.”143  By commit-
ting themselves to a formal approach to foreign affairs questions, lower
courts will become more consistent in their outcomes as new standards are
developed for issues that had previously been passed over as political
questions.
The second principle federal courts should use in making deference
determinations is a willingness to apply international law.  As noted in Part
III, the Supreme Court has held—and confirmed on more than one occa-
sion—that courts can and ought to apply international law when applica-
ble.144  It is true that some legal theorists do not see international law as
“real” law that would be binding on domestic courts.145  However, in prac-
tice, “almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and
almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.”146  The international
legal system of treaties, international court decisions, and customary interna-
tional law provides norms capable of being applied by U.S. courts.147  These
norms may not always be crystal clear, but it is an “established role of courts
[to] clarify[ ] murky areas of law by defining rules and imposing them on
diverse fact patterns.”148  If U.S. courts continue to show extreme deference
to the Executive or to refuse to hear cases involving foreign affairs questions,
clear standards will not evolve.  Targeted killings by drone strikes and indefi-
nite detentions of suspected terrorists are new issues arising with the chang-
ing nature of warfare.  Yet even the executive branch has acknowledged that
139 See id. at 404–39.
140 See supra Part III.
141 HENKIN, supra note 17, at 89.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).  This proposition was reaffirmed
much more recently in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004) (“For two centu-
ries we have affirmed that the domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of
nations.”).
145 See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599,
2599, 2608–09 (1997) (“John Austin[ ] soon concluded that international law rules are not
really law, because unlike domestic norms, they are not enforced by sovereign coercion.”).
146 LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979) (emphasis omitted).
147 See Charney, supra note 137, at 101.
148 FRANCK, supra note 137, at 49.
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it must comply with applicable norms of international law when engaging in
these activities.  In the Presidential Policy Guidance mentioned above, the
Obama administration required that drone strikes be in accordance with
international law of war, explaining, “[I]nternational legal principles, includ-
ing respect for a state’s sovereignty and the laws of war, impose important
constraints on the ability of the United States to act unilaterally—and on the
way in which the United States can use force—in foreign territories.”149  This
statement shows that the executive branch is making determinations about
the legality of its drone strikes.  If the Executive can make these legal deter-
minations, surely the courts, whose job it is to say what the law is, can review
them.  By showing less deference and answering difficult questions, courts
can help solidify this body of law for the future.
A third and final principle is that courts, when handling questions of
foreign affairs or national security, should focus on the narrow question with
which they are presented.  Following this principle will help courts avoid the
kind of policymaking discussed in Baker, leaving it where it belongs—with the
political branches.  By deciding cases with foreign policy implications, a court
is not thereby making foreign policy.150  For example, in Schneider v. Kis-
singer, the court found that it was barred from hearing the case in part
because doing so would require the court to “pass judgment on the policy-
based decision of the executive to use covert action to prevent that govern-
ment from taking power.”151  This is a misunderstanding of the court’s role.
It is certainly not the job of the court to make determinations of this sort, and
there is an important distinction between “the foreign policy decision itself”
and “the manner in which foreign policy decisions are implemented.”152
While it is not the job of the judiciary to lay down the policy for when the
United States may use covert operations to prevent a government from tak-
ing power, it can say whether, for the purposes of the specific case before it,
action already taken conforms to the applicable law.  In these circumstances,
the court is not making policy, but engaging in the longstanding practice of
judicial review to determine the constitutionality of government action.153
149 Memorandum of Presidential Policy Guidance from President Barack Obama on
Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets Located Outside the
United States and Areas of Active Hostilities 1–2 (May 22, 2013) https://www.aclu.org/
foia-document/presidential-policy-guidance?redirectNode/58033.
150 See FRANCK, supra note 137, at 5; see also Lisa Rudikoff Price, Note, Banishing the
Specter of Judicial Foreign Policymaking: A Competence-Based Approach to the Political Question Doc-
trine, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 323, 330 (2005).
151 Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 197 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
152 Stewart Pollock, A Political Embarrassment: Jurisdiction and the Alien Tort Statute, Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, and Political Question Doctrine, 51 CAL. W. L. REV. 225, 253–54
(2015).
153 See HENKIN, supra note 17, at 88 (“I am not suggesting that federal judges . . . should
issue orders to end a war or drop (or not drop) a bomb. . . . [N]othing in our constitution-
alism requires or warrants judicial second guesses on such issues.  A court should not
declare a question political and nonjusticiable when what the court means to say is that the
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V. DUE DEFERENCE IN PRACTICE
Part V will now apply the principles discussed in Part IV to two recent
cases in order to demonstrate how a court could use them in making defer-
ence determinations.
The first case, Bahlul v. United States,154 was recently decided in a per
curiam opinion by the en banc D.C. Circuit, and a writ of certiorari was
denied by the Supreme Court.155  Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul was
convicted by a military commission of conspiracy to commit war crimes for
assisting Osama bin Laden in planning the 9/11 attack on the United States.
Bahlul challenged his conviction on two constitutional grounds.  First, Bahlul
argued that “Congress exceeded its authority under Article I, § 8 of the Con-
stitution by defining crimes triable by military commission that are not
offenses under the international law of war.”156  Second, he claimed “Con-
gress violated Article III of the Constitution by vesting military commissions
with jurisdiction to try crimes that are not offenses under the international
law of war.”157  In June of 2015, the D.C. Circuit, in a three-judge panel,
initially vacated Bahlul’s conviction.158  In September, an en banc rehearing
was granted to review the panel’s decision on both constitutional claims.159
During this rehearing, a majority upheld Bahlul’s conviction, but only a four-
judge plurality addressed the constitutional question, finding that “consistent
with Articles I and III of the Constitution, Congress may make conspiracy to
commit war crimes an offense triable by military commission.”160  In reach-
ing their conclusion, the plurality, as represented by Judge Kavanaugh’s
opinion, found that Congress may make crimes not included in the interna-
tional law of war triable by military commission.161  The plurality relied on
“the text and original understanding of the Constitution; the structure of the
Constitution; landmark Supreme Court precedent; longstanding congres-
sional practice, as reflected in venerable and contemporary federal statutes;
particular exercise of authority by one of the political branches is within the constitutional
authority of that branch . . . .” (emphasis added)).
154 840 F.3d 757 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, No. 16-1307, 2017
WL 1550817 (Oct. 10, 2017).
155 Id.
156 Al Bahlul v. United States, 792 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2015), vacated and reh’g en banc
granted, 840 F.3d 757 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, No. 16-1307,
2017 WL 1550817 (Oct. 10, 2017).  Article I, § 8 grants Congress the power “[t]o define
and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
157 Al Bahlul, 792 F.3d at 3.
158 For an accessible summary of this opinion, see Zoe Bedell, An Overview of the DC
Circuit’s Opinion in Al Bahlul v. United States, LAWFARE (June 16, 2015), https://
www.lawfareblog.com/overview-dc-circuits-opinion-al-bahlul-v-united-states.
159 Order, 840 F.3d 757 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (ordering an en banc
rehearing).
160 Bahlul v. United States, 840 F.3d 757, 758 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (en banc) (plurality
opinion) (per curiam).
161 Id. at 760.
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and deeply rooted Executive Branch practice, from the 1800s to the
present.”162
This conclusion, as the dissent aptly points out, is far too deferential to
the Executive.163  Allowing the political branches to look outside the interna-
tional law and pick and choose which crimes are punishable by military com-
mission could be “just the first step toward a much greater usurpation of the
judiciary’s domain” and represents a
[B]reathtakingly expansive view of the political branches’ authority to sub-
ject non-service-members to military trial and punishment[,] . . . admit[ting]
only two constitutional constraints on its power to try individuals in law-of-
war military commissions: the charges must allege (1) that the individuals
are “enemy belligerents” who (2) engaged in proscribed conduct “in the
context of and associated with hostilities.164
An approach in line with the first principle, formalism, would help to
curtail this expansion.  By focusing on the text of the Constitution, as the
dissent does, one can see that “Article III commits the entire ‘judicial Power
of the United States’” to the federal courts.165  While there is a narrow excep-
tion for military commissions, nothing in the text of the Constitution or the
Supreme Court’s precedent indicates that Congress gets to define what
crimes those commissions may try—they are for trying offenses against the
international law of war.166  This brings the second principle into play—that
courts should be more willing to apply international law.  While the primary
concurrence did look to international law, it gave far too much deference to
Congress by ultimately allowing the legislature to look outside of interna-
tional law for the crime of conspiracy.  While Congress may have the power,
based on the Define and Punish Clause,167 to “clarify somewhat murky areas
of international law,” it does not have the “power to make up that law
entirely.”168  Turning then to the third principle—by reviewing the political
branches’ decision to include conspiracy as a crime triable by military com-
mission, a court is not making policy in the realm of foreign affairs.  A narrow
view of the question presented only requires a court to follow clearly estab-
lished international law, which shows that conspiracy is not included in the
international law of war.169  In doing so, a court would only be reviewing the
decision to assure its constitutionality.
162 Id.
163 See id. at 838 (Rogers, Tatel, and Pillard, JJ., dissenting) (“Whatever deference the
judiciary may owe to the political branches in matters of national security and defense, it is
not absolute.”).
164 Id. at 835.
165 Id. at 809 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1).
166 See id. at 816.
167 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 10.
168 Bahlul, 840 F.3d at 819 (Rogers, Tatel, and Pillard, JJ., dissenting).
169 Id. at 813.
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The second case is Ali Jaber v. United States,170 recently decided by the
D.C. Circuit.  This case was brought by the family of Salem and Waleed bin
Ali Jaber, an Islamic preacher and a policeman, respectively, who were killed
by a U.S. drone strike in Yemen in 2012.171  The district court did not reach
the merits of the case on the grounds that it was a political question,172 and
the case was appealed to the D.C. Circuit.  Judge Janice Rogers Brown wrote
both the majority opinion and a concurrence.  In the majority opinion,
Judge Brown affirmed the district court’s opinion, relying on El-Shifa as con-
trolling authority requiring application of the political question doctrine.173
She explained, “[i]n matters of political and military strategy, courts lack the
competence necessary to determine whether the use of force was justi-
fied.”174  The court could not decide this case, therefore, because it would be
required to “pass judgment on the wisdom of Executive’s decision to com-
mence military action . . . against a foreign target.”175
In this opinion, the D.C. Circuit, while faithfully applying precedent, was
overly deferential in its application of the political question doctrine.  Two
statements from the opinion exemplify this point.  First, when stating that
this case would require the court to “pass judgment on the wisdom of Execu-
tive’s decision to commence military action,”176 the court misunderstands
the proper question and looks at the issue too broadly.  To review this case,
the court would not need to establish whether the drone strike that killed the
Ali Jabers was a wise military decision.  Rather, it only needs to determine
whether the drone strike complied with clearly established international law
on the use of force.  By applying the third principle discussed above, focusing
on the narrow question presented, the D.C. Circuit would not have strayed
into political question territory and infringed on the role of the Executive.
This leads to the second passage, “In matters of political and military
strategy, courts lack the competence necessary to determine whether the use
of force was justified.”177  This statement either underestimates the ability of
the federal courts to handle complex disputes or overestimates the complex-
ity of international law regarding the use of force.  As laid out by amici
Professors Mary Ellen O’Connell and Douglass Cassel, there are “well-estab-
lished, manageable standards of international law that are regularly applied
by courts . . . to make judicial determinations of the lawful use of lethal
force.”178  Use of lethal force is justified if it falls into one of three categories:
(1) lethal force that occurs within a zone of armed conflict; (2) peacetime
170 861 F.3d 241 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
171 See id. at 243.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 246.
174 Id. at 247.
175 Id. at 246.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 247.
178 Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Mary Ellen O’Connell & Douglass Cassel in Sup-
port of Plaintiff-Appellants at 3, Ali Jaber v. United States, 861 F.3d 241 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(No. 16-5093).
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law enforcement; or (3) self-defense.179  Each of these categories provides
clear contours that courts can apply that are no more complicated than the
United States’ current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding search
and seizure.180  By showing a willingness to apply international law under the
second principle, courts will find the judicially manageable standards
required to resolve cases like Ali Jaber.
CONCLUSION
Federal courts must take a more disciplined approach to deference
determinations in cases raising questions of foreign affairs generally, and
national security issues specifically.  Cases like Bahlul and Jaber will continue
to arise, and federal courts need to discipline their deference to prevent a
dangerous expansion of power by the executive branch.  While discussing the
role of the federal courts in an influential work on foreign relations, Foreign
Affairs and the Constitution, Professor Louis Henkin noted—and the preceding
analysis confirms—that, while the lower courts have used the political ques-
tion doctrine to abstain from answering foreign affairs questions, the
Supreme Court has not.181  He explained, however, that if, as indicated in
Justice Brennan’s opinion in Baker v. Carr, the political question doctrine
allows or requires the Supreme Court to abstain from deciding cases related
to foreign affairs, the Court ought to “lay down standards or lines to guide
the discretion of the lower courts.”182  These words were written in 1972, but
the Supreme Court has yet to provide sufficient guidance to the lower courts
on matters of foreign affairs.  As cases like Bahlul and Ali Jaber make their way
through the federal courts, the Supreme Court ought to grant certiorari and
finally provide the standards that courts have sorely needed for over forty
years.
179 Id. at 5–14.
180 Id. at 27 (“American courts are expected to adjudicate claims of excessive use of
force by the police in the death of a single person.  This case asks the court to assess the
legality of a use of major firepower in which five people died.”).
181 See HENKIN, supra note 7, at 214.
182 Id. at 215 n.†.
